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Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of institutions in the global art market, Due to the asymmetrical 
distribution of information between art investors and the art institutions, there is uncertainty 
over the value of 'Fine Art' between those that wish to indirectly manipulate the price of art for 
the benefit of the institution, and those that wish to invest into the 'Fine Art' market. The value 
of 'Fine Art' is determined by the 'Value of Information', which has a direct positive relationship 
between quantity of information that the institution plans to hold, and the amount of uncertainty 
in the market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While it is evident that highly efficient markets may generate only very marginal returns, 
inefficient markets may create far better returns for investors in 'Fine Art'. Coffman (1998) 
alludes to this by arguing that a portfolio manager is constantly searching for profits within 
assets that will yield above normal risk-adjusted returns. It is further suggested that bargains 
are often unlikely in conventional financial assets found in typical efficient functioning markets. 
Efficiency may not extend across all of the market, thus, it is in this inefficient market that 
bargains become apparent, especially where these bargains may be found in tangible assets, 
most common in the market for art and antiques (Coffman, 1989).  
However, the market for 'Fine Art' would in any other market condition be viable if the market 
for 'Fine Art' would be efficient, yet, as we have already established the primary market for 
'Fine Art' is far from efficient, while the secondary market exhibits degrees of efficiency.  
A price transmission process between the secondary and the primary market is very evident 
in the market for 'Fine Art'. This transmission mechanism is created in the process of trading 
across both markets (Coffman, 1989). This transmission mechanism not only bridges the gap 
between the primary and secondary art market, but also has a regulating feature which is not 
purely a function of price (Baur, 2014). 
This transmission mechanism of information across the market for 'Fine Art' is a function of 
power distribution (Dunn, 2001), where the inefficiency in the market creates a platform for 
excessive profits for the players within the 'Fine Art' market. Information is the cornerstone 
relating to both strategy and the non-competitiveness of art within the asset markets. This is 
derived through the ‘value’ of the information that investors are prepared to compensate in 
order to offset the uncertainty associated with diversifying portfolios from the asset market into 
the art market, as an alternative.  
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MARKET INEFFICIENCY OR INDUCED STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
The asymmetrical distribution of information, or the lack thereof, is a large driver of market 
inefficiency in the market for 'Fine Art'. However, market inefficiency has only some of the 
answers, and it would be deemed appropriate to look at some additional aspects, specifically 
those aspects which relate to structural change. Such elements captured in the ‘structural 
change’ hypothesis could include modernisation, changing tastes and preferences, the type 
and nature of available data, the impact of evolving technology and the ease of finding new 
information. This is further emphasised by Mei and Moses (2002), whom state that when 
considering a case of ‘structural change’ within the (art) market, then, it would be more suitable 
for a researcher to choose a new model that would embrace ‘structural change’ rejecting the 
more common financial theories which are based on ‘efficient financial markets’, especially for 
the case where the markets evolve in a random manner, with unpredictable outcomes. 
In this case, the structural change theory could better explain (Erdos & Ormos, 2010) such 
features as the impact of globalisation on the sales of art, the ever expanding art market into 
the emerging markets, driven by the changing distribution of income and the growth of middle 
class economies in developing countries. Including here is the appearance of new investors 
and the introduction of more transparent price estimates into the primary art market through 
online auction houses and main stream art galleries who trade though the internet.  
Much of this ‘change’ is driven by beliefs and the belief systems inherent in the decision-
making process. But, the facts confronting the decision-maker change faster than their held 
belief systems, to the extent that, a strategy which is based on beliefs, may be a reasonable 
measure of strategic rigidity. In order to enhance the realism of cognition, it is important to 
incorporate insight and intuition into the decision-making process. Insight is a process which 
involves the comparison of alternatives or problems leading to a shift in gestalt (an organized 
whole that is perceived as more than the sum of its parts), while insight involves a shift in 
adaptations based on deep, intimate knowledge of markets and situations (Eisenhardt & 
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Zbaracki, 1992). Insight gives the decision-maker a heightened appreciation of the uncertainty 
that exists within the environment. 
Yet, under uncertainty, the more traditional approaches to strategic planning can be 
considered downright dangerous (Courtney et al., 1997) because planning on uncertainty 
creates an intellectual temptation for cognitive dissonance and confirmatory bias. The ultimate 
effect of this is that uncertainty undermines the value of flexibility of the decision-making 
process (Fitzsimmons, 2006). This is most relevant when examining the interaction between 
the institution (providers of information) and the firms (who make use of that information).  
Dunn (2001) points out that the essence of the institution is not about the set of transactions, 
but rather it’s all about the strategic decision-making that can be implemented into the market 
for some ultimate gain. As such, the institutions may engage with others in a non-competitive 
activity, for example, tactical collusion. Some companies may affect decisions which yield 
unique power or advantages to themselves, such as, the distribution of resources or gains at 
the expense of other companies. People engage in predefined political tactics which includes 
co-operation, coalition formation, and control of information, to enrich their own influence.  
The political perspective of this approach is the process by which conflict is resolved among 
competing organisations with individual perspectives. Typically, most organisational decisions 
follow the requirements and related choices of the most authoritative decision-makers. While 
decision-makers may often attempt to change the power structure by engaging in political 
tactics such as, cooperation strategies, the formation of coalitions and the strategic use of 
information (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). 
Despite the available technology and rapid online trading, Coffman (1989) mentions that while 
the international market for most assets may be increasingly efficient (symmetrical distribution 
of information), the market for art would be considered inefficient (where information about art 
related assets remains asymmetrical). Asymmetry of information would provide opportunities 
for the institutions to create above normal returns to their investment. Thus, investment 
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establishments could be seen as political systems in which strategic decision-makers have 
sometimes discerned objectives, while the buyers are limited through lack of expertise.  
Strategic decision-making may be seen as an interlacing of ‘bounded rationality’ and a 
complicated political processes. Thus, because of this ‘bounded rationality’, investors are 
often lacking the expertise to fully understand their investment decisions. Strategic decision-
makers engage in political games which most noticeably have an influence in the market 
(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). Information relating to a specific work of art or even information 
on a specific artist may be harder to acquire and interpret due to the lack of ‘real’ market 
transparency.  
INFORMATION AND VALUE 
As a starting point, let’s assume that acquiring Information about artwork of a specific artist, 
within a specific market, has a price of its own. The more useful the information is for the 
investor, the higher the value of that information, and the more likely it is to have a higher 
price. However, the value of this information may change over time and even holding ‘perfect’ 
information may have an expiry date. In other words, as suggested in the work of Chao (1981), 
‘perfect’ information that an investor may require could possibly have a time limit, in that, for 
any short-run decisions regarding relatively inelastic pricing for an exhaustive product such as 
'Fine Art', where the discount rate is sufficiently high, the future uncertainties become 
irrelevant, making the expected value of perfect information at that point in time unimportant 
to the long run decision.  
While the amount of information around any specific asset may correlate with the degree of 
market efficiency, the quantity and quality of information gives insight into the expected return 
of that asset. Thus, the price of an asset should also reflect the ‘value of information’ 
associated with that asset. This critical argument is further motivated by David Lawrence 
(1987), who mentions that the expected ‘value’ of the information regarding the decision to 
trade in a unit of art, which represents the maximum amount that the decision-maker should 
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invest into the analysis of the art or artist, before making the decision to invest. In the case of 
having perfect information, it would then be very easy to estimate the ‘true’ value of the asset 
which also depends on the accuracy of the information acquired (Lawrence, 1987). Accurate 
information provides an investor with a chance to make a better strategic decision so as to 
gain from the opportunities made available. However, the accuracy of the information is 
somewhat subjective, being that there are two sides to this coin. 
On the one side of the coin, the investor is constantly seeking better and more reliable 
information from which to make a suitable decision. On the other side of the coin, the institution 
could be holding back information that would be of benefit to the investor. It might be 
considered a less than desirable option for the institution to release all of the information held, 
for it is within this imperfect market with asemantic information flows, that larger profits may 
be possible. The decision to withhold information by the institution for its own gain is the basis 
of, what we are referring to in this paper as ‘Strategic Uncertainty’.  
STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY AND THE VALUE OF INFORMATION 
Conditions of ‘risk’ are those conditions that prevail in situations where the future outcomes 
are unknown, yet the probabilities of the outcomes can be estimated. Conditions of uncertainty 
(Fitzsimmons, 2006) are characterised by those conditions where there is no basis for 
estimating future probabilities. Uncertainty defines the strategic and operational environment 
today, and despite its intuitive appeal, applying uncertainty to strategic planning could be quite 
problematic and may inhibit the flexibility in the decision-making process. 
Uncertainty, in itself might not be completely devoid of probability. Lipshitz and Strauss (1997), 
suggest that while uncertainty is sometimes seen as a situation in which one has no 
knowledge about which of several states of nature has occurred or will occur, uncertainty is 
also sometimes seen as a situation in which one knows only the probability of which several 
possible states will occur. Thus, uncertainty is the inability to assert with certainty the ‘act-
event’ sequences, the ‘event-event’ sequences, the ‘value of consequences’ made in any 
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decision-making process. In any appropriate decision-making process, there will always be 
the inability to determine any accurate future preferences or actions, and therein lies the 
inability to effectively affect any future events (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). From this 
perspective, it’s the application of 'Strategic Uncertainty' which provides a possible explanation 
for the beliefs of an individual (Morris & Shin, 2002) whose behaviour exactly mimics the 
equilibrium behaviour of other decision-makers within an environment which has a strong 
information constraint, thus, exhibiting a degree of ‘bounded rationality’.  
Strategic decision-making is suitably described as a combination of bounded rationality and 
political insights, deciding when to co-ordinate strategies with competitors to form strategic 
alliances. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) point out that bounded rationality shapes the 
cognitive parameters and encompassing the strategic decision processes, while the political 
outlook shapes the social context (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). For a case, where the 
product is homogeneous, and when competition is reciprocating as in price competition, 
‘antagonistic strategies’ may develop, resulting in price wars and the eventual erosion of profit 
margins for all sides (Smit & Trigeorgis, 2006).  
Any increase in strategic opportunities corresponds with an increase in potential utility. This 
increase in the potential utility of information corresponds to a financial value (or price) and it 
is this value which is usually referred to as the 'Value of Information’. Decisions regarding the 
specific assets been traded, the strategies been implemented and the preferences of the 
individual investors is related to the 'Value of Information'. However, it must be stated that the 
same information can have different values for different investors (Yang et al., 2011), yet 
despite the non-specificity of the 'Value of Information', using the 'Value of Information' in a 
probabilistic analysis, can, according to Claxton, Neumann, Ariak and Weinstein (2001), 
contribute towards important decision-making strategies, such as, in setting up decision 
priorities, establishing a technically efficient decision-making design, and in so doing, efficient 
investment decisions. However, these decisions are not without a degree of Strategic 
Uncertainty. 
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EXPLORING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY IN THE ART MARKET 
'Strategic Uncertainty' is that uncertainty concerning actions and beliefs (and the beliefs about 
the beliefs of other people). This is slightly different from ‘Structural Uncertainty’ where the 
uncertainty is down to the fundamentals displayed in the inadequacy of an economic model, 
sometimes referred to as model bias, or even model discrepancy (Morris & Shin, 2002). Within 
the art market, investors theoretically choose a particular optimal strategy. To the investor, 
this strategy may be optimal, even though they may hold narrow beliefs about the actions 
taken by other investors. In such situations, even the slightest uncertainty about other 
investors’ choices might lead an investor to deviate from his or her equilibrium strategy 
(Andersson et al., 2014). However, individuals have social (distributional) preferences and/or 
reciprocal preferences. Consequently, they dislike inequality in rewards and according to 
Cabrales, Miniaci, Provesan and Ponti (2006), inequalities in rewards are often necessary to 
force the high-effort required to find suitable information that will add value to the investment 
by reducing the uncertainty.  
Given the search for available information, much of the decision-making within the realm of 
uncertainty must hold several essential elements which makes the response of individuals 
very different from each other and sometimes very difficult to predict, namely, the elements of 
‘subjectivity’, ‘inclusivity’ and ultimately, ‘affect’. ‘Subjectivity’ would be seen as different levels 
of doubt for similar situations. ‘Inclusivity’ would hold within it, for example, ignorance of future 
outcomes. Finally the ‘affect’ would embrace behaviours, such as, hesitancy to make a 
decision, indecisiveness or even procrastination, thus making uncertainty highly subjective 
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) and resulting in choices that may not be optimal. 
Thus, for a decision process to result in an optimal choice, it must be oriented toward achieving 
appropriate goals, based on accurate information associating various substitutes to these 
goals, and also based on accepting and understanding the current environmental constraints 
at the time of the decision (Dean Jr & Sharfman, 1996). This implies that choices follow a 
dynamic process, and in the words Chao (1981), if the 'Value of Information' for certain 
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products are dynamic, then it would further imply that choices may follow some form of 
changing pattern too, depending on who the specific investor is, and what kind of risk 
strategies the investor would be prepared to follow. It may be safe to suggest that for high 
levels of uncertainty associated with a choice to investment, the 'Value of Information' for that 
uncertainty would be high. If the level of uncertainty were to decrease, then the 'Value of 
Information' for that choice would decrease too. 
DETERMINING THE SLOPE OF THE 'VALUE OF INFORMATION' CURVE, FOR 'FINE 
ART’.  
The higher the uncertainty, the greater the price that people would be prepared to pay for 
information relating to that uncertainty. The more art one plans to invest in, the more choices 
need to be made (Graph B in figure 1), and the greater the uncertainty and the higher the price 
that an investor would plan to pay to acquire such information to offset the associated 
uncertainty (Graph A in figure 1). The relationship between price of information and the 
quantity of art invested into would have a positive relationship (VOI in Graph A of Figure 1).  
In other words, plotting the 'Value of Information' curve would typically have a positive 
relationship between quantity of art invested (more choices) and the price to acquire the 
specific information. The sensitivity to uncertainty would determine the steepness of the slope 
to such a relationship. The positive slope also implies a supply side relationship. In other 
words, it is not the demand for information, but the supply of information that determines the 
sensitivity relationship. Art institutions hold information, and it’s through the supply of this 
information that affects the choice to invest into art.  
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FIGURE 1: Uncertainty and the price of information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baur & Els (2015) 
If the decision to invest would be deemed perfectly insensitive to the uncertainty, then the 
'Value of Information' would be perfectly vertical (inelastic), at which point, the price of the 
information has no relationship to the quantity of the art been invested. In this case the choice 
to invest would not more be related to the quantity of art been invested but rather on a specific 
piece of information that would be deemed relevant to that investor. At this point the supply 
and demand for art on the secondary art market, (which determines the price of the art on the 
secondary art market), has no impact on the value of art been traded on the primary art market. 
The primary art market becomes disassociated from the secondary art market. 
Yang, Ewald and Wang (2011) mention that the choice of an investor or dealer depends on 
how much information in individual investor or dealer already has at his disposal. The value of 
this information is then obtained by estimating the level of the optimal expected utility that the 
investor or dealer can gain by acquiring additional information given his current amount of 
information and an increased in the level of information that he may acquire over time. The 
primary art market suppliers are aware that by sharing some types of information, especially 
QA2 
VOI 
P
I S
ec
on
da
ry
 M
ar
ke
t 
P
I S
ec
on
da
ry
 M
ar
ke
t 
QA2* 
QA Secondary Market Uncertainty 
U U* 
Pi1 
Pi2 
Pi1 
Pi2
Graph B Graph A 
12 
 
confidential business information (such as the motives underlying promoting certain types of 
'Fine Art'), may undermine their competitive position through undermining pricing strategies 
and quite inadvertently lowering the levels of market uncertainty, resulting in losing their 
competitive position further (Hsiao, 2005). This may result an increase in demand by investors 
or the rapid increase in the supply of tradable works of art, which would be measurable in the 
increase in the number of transactions. The additional supply of art into the market may have 
a negative impact on the exchange of higher price items, such as works of art by the well-
known artists, and will see more of the lesser known names entering into the market. This 
became very apparent on the international art market post 2013. While the number of 
transactions increased, the returns for investments into art began to fall, resulting in the 
decrease of the Artprice index.  
FIGURE 2: Changes in the Artprice index from1998-2017, 1998=100.  
 
 
Source: Artprice.com (2017) 
INFORMATION SHARING, LEADING TO GREATER EFFICIENCY, OR NOT 
In order to drive greater market efficiency, the relationship between 'Value of Information' and 
uncertainty could be reduced with the aid of ‘information sharing’. If all parties would share 
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information, even to the point of perfect information, then the uncertainty of investing in 'Fine 
Art' would be reduced, and the market wold become increasingly efficient. This idea is 
supported by the work of Hsiao and Shieh (2006), who point out that information sharing plays 
an important part in harmonizing various factors involved in the investment decision of the 
assist. Yet, this would not automatically translate into an optimal strategy by the players in the 
art market. An optimal solution would most likely involve holding information by the institutions.  
Hsiao and Shieh (2006) emphasise that because players in the market for 'Fine Art' have their 
own profit maximising aims, institutions would prefer to hold certain information, creating an 
inefficient market environment. If they would cooperate with each other, the market would 
become more efficient, reducing uncertainty and potentially lowering potential profits. This 
would result in the increase in supply of art into the market, and while there would be greater 
efficiency, there may be greater risk to the investor as possible future returns would possibly 
be reduced. Thus, the market may rally on the greater efficiency, the decision to invest into 
'Fine Art' by the investors in the primary market may become quite bearish.  
If the distribution of information is asymmetric, and the cost of withholding information is 
relatively inexpensive, then institutions will hold back more information. This allows institutions 
within the market to save resources by offering other investors substantially less information. 
The principal of 'Strategic Uncertainty' faces a trade-off between fairness and robustness: 
fairness can be obtained only at the expense of robustness (Cabrales et al., 2010). Morris and 
Shin (2002) mention that if private information is sufficiently accurate, relative to the amount 
of available public information, then a market position of multiple equilibria would coexist with 
different people holding common knowledge of the fundamentals inherent in the investment.  
The accuracy of this public information can reveal complex effects that arise from the interplay 
between holding, releasing or interpreting this information. An investor’s exertion of effort to 
acquire additional information induces a positive externality on the effectiveness of other 
investors. Some investors may believe that the effort to acquire this information is paid off 
through higher returns, with other investors confidently believing that these highly paid 
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(informed) investors will make more of an effort to contribute towards the market. Therefore, 
the cost of the institution to hold back on information starts to rise with the investors seeking 
out new information, or creating their own information. The higher cost of holding such 
information increases (shown as Y2 X2 to Y1 X1 in figure 2). If the cost of holding such 
information increases, institutions may find it more difficult to hold onto the information, 
reducing the information asymmetry.  
At this stage in the game, investors now find information gathering less expensive and can 
hold more information than before. The shift of information from the institutions to the investors 
(A1 to B1 in figure 2, Graph C) induces an increase in demand for 'Fine Art' (Di1 to Di2 in 
figure 2, Graph D), reducing the overall risk as perceived future returns to the art investment 
begins to increase. Alternatively the supply of art begins to increase (Si1 to Si1* in figure 2 of 
Graph D), increasing risk for the investor, as perceived profits begin to fall. 
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FIGURE 3: The role of the institution and the demand for information in the primary art market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baur & Els (2015) 
A BIASE DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION 
Investment into information may influence the competitor’s behaviour, which in turn influences 
the resulting equilibrium (Smit & Trigeorgis, 2006), in such a way that it strengthens their own 
competitive position, and presumably the long-term value of the investment. For this purpose, 
there are two types of information that need to be distinguished from each other, namely, 
‘public information’ and ‘private information’. Public information refers to that information that 
is (somewhat freely) available to investors. Private information is that information that is held 
by the institution. Institutions protect their information that they have, as it is important in 
determining ‘assumed’ value, highlighted in their own individual’s informational preferences 
and beliefs. We might assume that the players (investors and institutions) in the market 
already display a significant degree of heterogeneity in their preference for information 
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(Cabrales et al., 2010). Within the market, equality of information is of less importance than 
the robustness of information. Also it is assumed that a fair distribution of information yields 
inefficient outcomes, lowering potential profitability. The primary decision-makers or 
‘principals’ (Cabrales et al., 2010) arrange their requirements for information according to their 
own social preferences. These principals usually set contracts in tune with their own estimated 
information distribution preferences, even if these contracts operate under a ‘Veil of 
Ignorance’, wherein the individual players will hope to win eventually.  
Players using information that ‘does not quantify the risk’, make decisions in ignorance 
(without any suitable information on probabilities and utilities) (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). The 
‘ignorance’ mentioned here implies that, according to Aberg (2015:256) “a priori distribution in 
principle has an infinite variance but since we must attribute the ability to the decision maker 
to enumerate all the future states of nature and to specify the pay-off matrix in order to avoid 
a partial solution, we must assume that he treats the set of future outcomes as a bounded set” 
Decision-making within the framework of ignorance can be pounded down to the use of 
assumption based reasoning, and an over reliance on ‘expert’ opinion, which can sometimes 
be referred to, in the words of Aberg (2015), ‘partially ignorant’ because the probabilistic beliefs 
or even the probability distribution is given without any reference to any suitable observation 
of a ‘real’ nature. While this may reduce uncertainty-induced-anxiety, it may give rise to 
‘cognitive dissonance’, which is a situation where the goals are inconsistent across different 
people at different times, while the search for information is often locally (using the same 
sources of information)  and which is generally both biased and standardised (Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992). This may induce a new set of conflicts for the decision-maker. These conflicts 
experienced by the decision-maker is habitually pacified through ‘herd-like’ behaviour 
mentality, or, in other words, the ‘political’ decision-making processes. Investors seeking new 
information may feel overwhelmed when confronted with endless layers of somewhat 
contradictory information. Also, no real relief is provided by the ‘experts’, who are also, 
somewhat inadvertently, blanketing the many information gaps. This could be illustrated with 
17 
 
a football game as an analogy. In this football game the players are all blindfolded, and the 
many spectators are standing at the lines, shouting to the player’s many different suggestions 
of what the players should do, often making comments, sometimes giving commands, while 
the players themselves are trying to avoid bumping into each other in the search for the ball. 
But the ball itself may have left the field, and nobody really knows.     
While effective decisions should be based around organizational goals, the political decision-
making process is organized around the self-interests of individuals or in some cases, around 
group thinking. This is discussed at length in the work of Dean and Sharfman (1996), who 
show how group decision-making processes can influence decision-making performance. 
However, it is the processes of individual rationalization that threatens an individual’s decision 
success, and in experiments, it has been shown that group thinking can improve decision-
making under uncertainty. Group thinking does not necessarily representing the interests of 
the individual and the individual will still choose that action which provides the greatest 
expected utility (Aberg, 2015).  
The decision-maker may consider a number of approaches in order to rationalise this decision, 
even if following the preferences of the group. Information symmetry (brought about by the 
increase in the amount of public information) is not totally detrimental to firms. While pre-
emption may reduce risk (Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011), Morris and Shin (2002) mention 
that an increase in public information may convey additional information on the underlying 
fundamentals about value. This additional information serves as a focal point for the group 
(investors and institutions alike). Public information may serve to reinforce the impact on 
individual decisions to the detriment of private information (Morris & Shin, 2002). The cost 
associated with protecting the information held by the institutions is ‘optimal’ to the institution, 
by guaranteeing returns. Gordon and Loeb (2002) mentions that the type of information an 
institution would need to protect would include issues such as the confidentiality, availability, 
authenticity, non-repudiation, and integrity of the artist or art been traded.  
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These institutions incur costs such as professional fees, hospitality and travel costs, IT costs, 
packaging and shipping fees, costs for insurance and security, restoration and conservation 
fees, art fairs and marketing costs (Petterson, 2011). At the extreme level the private source 
of information may ‘crowd out’ any public information. This means that (Gordon, 2002) due to 
the higher risk associated with investing into a relatively unknown artist entering into the 
market, the greater the cost associated with protecting that information about the artist.  
Dunn (2001) proposes that, in an uncertain environment, the centrality of control and power is 
of prime importance. There is an overwhelming need to acquire control of strategic cost factors 
(such as the information pertaining to the artist), in order to mitigate the impact of the uncertain 
market environment, which is paramount in ensuring the survival of the company and possibly 
even the market.  
Modern portfolio decision-making deals with a long-term vision based on uncertainty, and 
according to Oh, Yang and Lee (2012), the uncertainty focuses specifically on the levels of 
insufficient information which may lead to unreliable decisions. As new markets are appearing, 
the product life cycle for most assets appear to be getting shorter, and as the costs associated 
with maintaining a market share through innovation are getting higher, many companies have 
to continuously introduce new products to the market, and strategic planning to promote and 
protect the assets is critical (Oh et al., 2012).  
However, in a relatively stable business environment, even powerful tools used to analytically 
predict the future can fail as many factors exist outside of the business within the environment 
which contain such high levels of uncertainty and where predictions are less than suitably 
reliable from where to make sound strategic decisions (Courtney et al., 1997). 
It may also become too expensive for an institution to monitor an entire market to protect even 
small levels of information change. According to Morris and Shin (2002), when there is 
sufficient information concerning the underlying asset, the equilibrium in the market maximizes 
social welfare. When there exists sufficient levels of imperfect information, the welfare effects 
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of an increase in the amount of public information could have very uncertain results for the 
investor as the market can also over react to the change in public information.  
Establishing the right amount of information is then paramount to the primary market, and 
often, securing such market inefficiency is such an important component of price setting 
behaviour. Risks to such institutions could include breaching of confidentiality or where 
multiple sources of potential information about an artist is leaked into the public sector. The 
increased sensitivities within the market for 'Fine Art' could magnify any disruptive ‘noise’ of 
the public information to such a large extent that (Morris & Shin, 2002) the available public 
information increases or when investors distrust the information that they have, creating more 
harm than good within the market. This would imply that even though incomplete information 
is the most frequently cited source of uncertainty, the decision-maker is often unable to make 
a decision. This is because of the overabundance of information combined with conflicting 
meanings (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). This situation may induce conflict or dissidence or doubt 
for an investor when trying to determine where the most suitable investment might lie. In this 
situation there might not be a change in the demand for information, as the information that is 
held by the decision-maker is understood, remain undifferentiated, and any change in 
information does not show any positive or negative gains to the decision-making process. 
Therefore, investors do not move from their existing portfolios, there is no desire to seek 
additional information.  
When analysing the 'Value of Information', the possible increase in uncertainty or the reduction 
of the expected loss of returns to the 'Fine Art' asset needs to be appropriately assessed, once 
all the information about that artist has entered into the market. Chevalier-Roignant, Flath, 
Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2011) suggest that an investor can effectively make an early 
strategic investment that alters the later game structure by inducing an ‘asymmetry of 
information’ among other investors, in other words, by sharing additional information with 
selected players. The strategic effect depends on the intent, commitment and competitive 
reaction of the other players. It might appear that early ‘‘overinvestment’’ is the optimal solution 
20 
 
as the leading firm acquires a strategic advantage by blocking the market to new potential 
entrants. Under extreme market uncertainty, the incentive to make a settled investment is 
limited (but not impossible) when supposing that future prospects for the market could be too 
risky. Any initial investment decision requires that the committing firm weighs the cost of a 
commitment against the expected future strategic benefits (Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011).  
INFORMATION AS A RISK FACTOR 
Companies may analyse their portfolio regularly for efficient resource allocations, and the 
alignment of the asset portfolios with their corporate strategies. Consistent analysis is required 
because the portfolio decision-making significantly affects not only annual sales and profits 
but also long-term growth (Oh et al., 2012). Related to growth are risks and the risks that are 
nearly absent in the financial market are sometimes very substantial in the arts market (Frey 
& Cueni, 2013). 
Trying to determine the optimal amount to spend on protecting the 'Value of Information' of 
'Fine Art' is an increasing function of the level of vulnerability of such information (Gordon, 
2002). Fitzsimmons (2006) emphasises this by stating that unchecked belief systems based 
on scepticism has the power to marginalise the appropriate analysis of this information. This 
results in large additional cost for ‘ambiguous benefits’ by certain decision-makers through 
parochial interests which completely undermine the flexibility in the market (Fitzsimmons, 
2006).  
The information hungry market has led to the increase in the production of anticipatory 
statistics (such as an increase in art price indices, art market reports, market analysis) and 
more extensive use of econometric forecasting models to determine future market outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the nature of forecast information varies according to the type of decision 
problem involved and the type of strategy used to manage those uncertainties (Aberg, 2015), 
and these vary from investor to investor.  
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Claxton, Neumann, Araki and Weinstein (2001), mention that in an inefficient market, 
information is particularly valuable to investors as it can help reduce expected costs 
associated with the uncertainty involved in the decision-making process. Information is 
vulnerable to interpretation adding to the scepticism of the decision-maker. The expected 
costs of uncertainty are determined by the probability that an investment decision which is 
based on existing information could be incorrect. The associated costs of uncertainty can also 
be seen as the expected value of been able to acquire perfect information.  
The cost to the investor for this information would be the maximum amount that a decision-
maker would be willing to pay for additional information into an investment decision with the 
aim of improving decisions in the future. If the expected value of perfect information exceeds 
the expected costs of finding any additional information, then it would then be potentially more 
cost-effective for an investor to find more information. The more an investor is prepared to 
invest in finding additional information, the more likely that the investor would be to reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding his investment decision (Claxton et al., 2001).  
In other words, greater levels of uncertainty means the more an investor would be prepared 
to pay for such information. This may not always be the case, as highlighted by the work of 
Eeckhoud and Godfroid (1995), mentioning that there are going to be situations (but not the 
norm) where the higher the risk, the lower the 'Value of Information', despite the widely 
accepted view that the 'Value of Information' has a positive relationship with risk and 
uncertainty. Not having such information would be a risk factor that the investor would need 
to build into the decision-making model. If there is little or no information about a particular 
artist, then that would translate into high level of risk to the investor.  
In order to offset the risk associated with introducing a new or even a relatively unknown artist 
into the art market, a large amount of information gathering would be simultaneously required 
to offset this risk.  
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MEASURING THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH MARKET FOR 'FINE ART' USING THE 
CAPM MODEL 
This paper uses the CAPM model to examine the risk associated with investment into the 'Fine 
Art' market. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a financial model which analyses the 
relationship between systematic risk (overall market risk) and the expected returns for a 
specific asset or group of assets.  
The generalised formula for CAPM is: ra = rf + β(Rm – rf) + α, where ra is the risk associated 
with the asset, rf is the risk free rate, (or the risk of the standardised market indicator, such as 
S&P 500), Rm is the expected market return, alpha (α) is the intercept and β is the risk index 
value. While α is usually not a part of the CAPM model, it represents the vertical intercept and 
gives an indication of how much better or worse the asset performed compared to what the 
CAPM predicted. 
There are two components to this model, namely the time value of money and risk. The time 
value of money is represented by the risk-free (rf) rate, a compensation for investors for 
investing in over a period of time. The risk-free rate is that investment that is used for a 
benchmark, and in many cases the S&P 500 is used. 
The CAPM equation denotes risk and estimates the compensation which the investor needs 
for taking on any additional risk. This is estimated by taking a risk measure Beta, (β), which 
compares the returns to the asset over a period of time to the market premium (Rm-rf).  Beta 
reflects how risky an asset is compared to overall market risk and is a function of the volatility 
of the asset and the market as well as the correlation between the two. In other words, this 
model examines the expected return of an asset or portfolio, which equals the rate on a risk-
free asset and an additional risk premium.  
FIGURE 4: Artprice index and Beta (β) for the art price index using S&P 500 as the risk free 
index 
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Source: Artprice Index and Reuters Data (2017) 
 
 
For the market for 'Fine Art', using the Artprice index against the S&P 500, the adjusted R2 
value 0.31 implies that only 31% of the assets performance is explained by the risk exposure. 
The alfa (α) value, indicating the performance of the asset indicates that the art market 
underperformed (α = -150.84). According to Baur (2017), the low performance of the market 
for 'Fine Art' is as a result of other factors, such as the value of the asset to investors, and 
other social, psychological and institutional factors. ‘Art’ as an investment item may be different 
from other conventional investments in that art may also be a ‘store of value’, which has very 
different behavioural trends from equity markets, where equities would be seen as a means 
of generating profit while the ‘art’ market may be perceived as a market for goods which hold 
profit. 
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The average value of Beta (β), between 1998 and 2016 was -0.2817. Usually one would 
expect that the value of Beta to be positive. However, in the case of commodities, where there 
is a store of value, such as in gold, then a negative beta would imply a ‘store of value’.  This 
occurred 48% of the time between 1998 and 2017. If the value of beta is greater than 1, it 
implies that the art market is riskier than the general market, but potentially more profitable 
than the S&P 500 (this occurred 52% of the time), and in the case of beta greater than 0 but 
less than 1, it would imply that the art market is less risky, but with lower returns to the S&P 
500. This only occurred 19% of the time between 1998 and 2017.  
 
USING STRUCTURAL BREAKS TO JUSTIFY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TOBIN’s 
SPECULATIVE DEMAND AS BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS RISK 
Karmakar (2016), Van der Merwe, Mollentze, Leshoro, Vermeulen (2014) mention that Tobin 
developed a model for the demand of an asset in which he suggested that people do not only 
consider the expected return from that asset, but also the risk associated with holding that 
asset. Tobin therefore constructs a model considering that the demand for the asset is also a 
store of wealth. In this example, Art is also a store of wealth (Baur, 2017). The focus of this 
model is on an individual’s portfolio allocation between assets and a risk free investment 
subject to the wealth constraint. In Tobin’s theory, we can assume that the expected capital 
gain is zero, because the individual investor expects capital gains and losses to be equally 
probable.  
The best expectation of returns, as in this study, S&P 500, is simply the prevailing market rate 
of interest (i), which is also the amount of the expected return on that investment. It can be 
assumed that the S&P 500 investment is largely risk free. The actual return also includes 
capital gains or losses, as the interest rate does not generally remain fixed. Risk free assets 
provide an expected return of interest, but the actual return is uncertain due to the fact that 
the market rate of interest fluctuates even in the short run. If only art is held in the portfolio, 
returns would be maximum, the risk to which the investor is exposed will also be maximum. A 
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risk averse investor would voluntarily sacrifice some return for a reduction in risk of his 
portfolio.  
Tobin’s theory indicates that on the vertical axis of the upper quadrant we measure the 
expected return to the portfolio (r-rf) and on the horizontal axis we measure the riskiness of 
the portfolio (Km-rf). The expected return on the portfolio is the potential gain that can be earned 
on risk free asset (Karmakar, 2016). Using the CAPM model to plot the relationships of the 
returns to the Artprice index and the returns to the S&P 500 index, indicates a positive 
relationship. The associated relationship would be in the format of (ra - rf ) and (Rm - rf ), with a 
56% correlation. 
FIGURE 5: Deriving the ‘value of information curve’ using CAPM methodology for returns to 
the Artprice index between 1998 and 2017. 
 
 
Source: Data derived from Artprice index and Reuters SPX (2017) 
Figure 5 shows the positive relationship between the returns to the Artprice index and the 
returns to the S&P 500. Despite the wide dispersion of the scatterplot, the clearly positive 
relationship exists and is consistent with the concept of 'Value of Information', in other words, 
according to van der Merwe et.al., (2014), an opportunity line which shows the relationship 
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between risk and return. The attitude of individual investors within this model will be shown by 
individual indifference curves. The slope of the individual indifference curves is determined by 
the attitude of the individual’s portfolio holders towards risk. 
There are two major structural breaks that are identified in this paper, namely, 1998 to 2008, 
2008 to 2013, and 2013 to 2017. According to Baur (2017), art as a store of value, is often 
used by investors as a hedge against inflation (as in commodities), rather than as a profit 
function. The movement in art prices is highly correlated with the movement in commodity 
prices (adjusted R2 of 0.88). When considering the correlation between the Artprice index, and 
the two structural breaks, (Baur, 2017) it can be deduced that there is a far greater correlation 
between the Artprice Index and the first structural break (2008) with a 61% correlation. The 
correlation between the Artprice index and the second structural break (2013) shows a lower 
correlation of 29%. Yet, by separating the regressions, one for before 2013 and post 2013, 
the market show a positive relationship between art price and S&P before 2013, and a strong 
negative relationship post 2013 (adjusted R2 of 0.36 and 0.33, respectively). Furthermore, the 
low liquidity of the art market is captured in the lag effect on the regression analysis using the 
Ordinary Leased Squares (OLI) methodology.  
 
FIGURE 6: Artprice index and S&P industrial index showing performance of respective 
markets from first quarter 1998 to final quarter 2016. 
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Source: Derived from Artprice.com (2017), and Reuters (2017), Quantec (2017) 
 
Regarding the movement between commodities and equities, the relationship was similar to 
that of the Artprice index, with a slightly stronger adjusted R2 values of (+) 0.6 and a (-) 0.5 
before and after 2013 respectively. By repeating this data analysis between Artprice index and 
commodities index, before and after 2013, the market show a very strong structural shift, 
adjusted R2 of 0.87 and 0.80, respectively, indicating a change in market behaviour, and the 
corresponding downward movement in art market performance. Using an OLS regression 
analysis of Artprice index, and commodities, it appears that commodities themselves include 
within them the impact of market volatility as well as capturing the 2008 financial crisis. Despite 
the usual volatility, the prices of commodities spiked in 2008 and then spiked again in 2012. It 
was at both of these times that saw the start of another downward cycle for the art market, 
indicated by a drop in the performance of the Artprice index, both post 2008 and post 2012. 
In effect, considering the effect of commodities (t = 18.67) and by lagging the S&P index by 
four quarters (t = 3.58), and taking into account the impact of the 2008 financial crisis (t = -
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3.2), and accounting for spikes in the commodity index (t = 2.79), the data analysis indicated 
an adjusted R2 value of 0.91, implying that the impact of commodity spikes does have an 
impact on the structural change in the Artprice index (Baur, 2017). 
 
Using the two major structural breaks that are identified in Baur (2017), namely, 1998 to 2008, 
2008 to 2013, and 2013 to 2017, and applying the theory of Tobin, the following relationships 
highlighted in figures 7 to 9 become apparent.  
FIGURE 7: Deriving the changing relationship of risk and return for investors between 1998 
and 2008. 
 
Source: Derived from Artprice.com (2017), and Reuters (2017) 
During the period 1998 to 2008, the slope of Tobin moved upwards. See figure 5. It was during 
this phase that the market for 'Fine Art' appeared to be less volatile than the market for other 
assets, measured here as the S&P 500. It was during this phase that the art market was 
becoming recognised as an alternative investment for portfolios.  
FIGURE 8: Deriving the changing relationship of risk and return for investors from 2008 to 
2013. 
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Source: Derived from Artprice.com (2017), and Reuters (2017) 
From the period 2008 to 2013, in figure 8, the slope of Tobin moves in both upwards and 
downwards. It was during this phase that the market for 'Fine Art' appeared to be a lot more 
volatile post the 2008 financial crisis (which represents the first structural break). During this 
phase, the market for art appeared to outperform the S&P 500, but represented much higher 
levels of volatility. 
 
FIGURE 9: Deriving the changing relationship of risk and return for investors from 2013 to 
2017. 
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Source: Derived from Artprice.com (2017), and Reuters (2017) 
From the period 2013 to 2017, as indicated by figure 9, the slope of Tobin moves strongly 
downwards. It was during this phase that investments in the art market were underperforming 
against the S&P 500. The relationship between the S&P 500 and the Artprice index is shown 
earlier in figure 6. 
PUTTING PRACTICE INTO THEORY 
Looking at figure 10, and beginning with Graph A, the relationship between the expected return 
and uncertainty is shown as the 'Value of Information'. The 'Value of Information' has a positive 
slope as shown earlier in figure 5. An increase in the degree of uncertainty will have a positive 
relationship with the expected returns. If returns are expected to be higher, associated with 
higher risk, then there will be an increase in the ‘value’ of the information. This could be 
associated with the need to hedge against that risk. Graph B shows the respective distribution 
of information between the Private and the Public Sector.  A higher uncertainty regarding art 
or an artist will increase the demand for additional information relating to that artist or art.  
The cost associated with holding information by the institution begins to rise, forcing the 
information to move from the private (institution) into the public (market) domain. This is shown 
as a swivel of the cost of information curve from Y2X2 to Y1X1, and a shift from A1 to B1 on the 
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information isoquant of Graph B. The increase in information in Graph B is accompanied by 
an increase in the overall supply of art in the art market from Si1 to Si1*, or a corresponding 
change in equilibrium of C1 to E1 on Graph C. At C1 on Graph C, the expected returns are 
higher indicated by Pi1 on Graph C. This was made possible by the limited supply of 
information at point A1 on Graph B. As the available information increases through an increase 
in the demand for information, it forced the price of art in the primary art market to decrease 
to Pi3 on graph C. The decrease in prices in the art market reduced the confidence of investors 
by showing lower returns to their investment.  
These lower returns caused the corresponding Tobin relationship to move from F1 to G1 on 
Graph D. The move from F1 to G1 is indicated by an increase in uncertainty (r-rf) and a 
decrease in expected returns (Km-rf). The market index for art begins to show lower returns 
compared to the comparative indices (S&P 500). This causes an increase in uncertainty, 
portfolios begin to adjust with the changing expectations, and the 'Value of Information' begins 
to increase, resulting in a new search for information in Graph A. 
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FIGURE 10: Impact of changing supply factors in the market for 'Fine Art' and the impact on 
Tobin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INCREASING SUPPLY OF 'FINE ART' POST 2013 
Baur (2017) mentions that the number of sales in art rose in 2016 by 3.2%, while sales turnover 
dropped by 25%, almost entirely due to a lower prices for major masterpieces (works priced 
over $10 million). Compared to the 2015 art market performance, London art markets dropped 
30% and New York art markets dropped 49%. However, China’s art market is still experiencing 
significant reformation (a new market regulation pertaining to 'Fine Art' was introduced in early 
2016 so as to standardize China’s domestic art market and to regulate trading behaviour while 
protect the rights and interests of the artists, sellers, and consumers. China’s overall unsold 
rate was at 64% while its total turnover increased by 18%. Stock markets around the globe 
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where particularly volatile post 2013 and the market for hedge funds fell considerably. Many 
of the new art investments that had previously driven the global art market prior to 2013 begun 
to diminish. 
IN CONCLUSION 
There is nothing homogenous about art which is a product of creativity and innovation, and 
value art may be hidden far beneath the intrinsic factors that it is constructed from. Limiting 
the value of art to its mere potential of holding its value for resale at a later date is rather 
overambitious for any person attempting to try and determine a value for the 'Fine Art' being 
traded. Considering the aesthetics of Fine Art, without further consideration of the emotional, 
psychological and cultural factors of the respective investors, is only one small part of the 
entire analysis.  
Naturally, investors wish to hold an asset for favourable future returns, and the decision that 
an investor makes is dependent on the information that they are able to derive from the 
markets, but as the market is typically inefficient. The level of inefficiency could be broadened 
still further due to a lack of sufficient information regarding the investment by the investor into 
the market for 'Fine Art', creating a rather uncertain environment in which to trade. 
Within the market, the level of uncertainty creates a value of its own. Markets can co-ordinate 
information flows, and create means of co-operation between members of the primary market 
by using this uncertainty in a strategic way, in order to derive excessive profits. There exists 
political and social motives for such co-ordination, but with the aim of maintaining higher value 
for the investments been traded within the inefficient market environment.  
Where strategic uncertainty creates opportunities, it also has the potential of undermining the 
market by making it extremely difficult to offset for risk. Many organisations, the likes of Mei & 
Moses and Artprice set regular index figures by processing auction set data from major auction 
houses, such as Christies and Sotheby’s, with which to create a measure against the overall 
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market. These indexes are not necessarily reliable, making derivative trading near impossible 
to establish and making risk instruments difficult to quantify. 
Using the CAPM methodology, and distinguishing structural breaks in the data, defines how 
the 'Value of Information' relating to the market for 'Fine Art' is central to any study of the Art 
market. Without a thorough investigation into how the role that this information plays and the 
strategic significance through the political co-ordination of such information, it is near 
impossible to understand the relationship that exists between the primary and the secondary 
art market. Information holds value and this 'Value of Information' is significant in prices setting 
and determining investor returns.  
Institutions control this information. The control of this information may be the reason why 
some artists are promoted while others are not. The development of art price indices are often 
a blanket used to camouflage the institutions hold over such information. As long as there is 
a blanket hiding from view the real value of art, the investor and the institution may gain 
excessive profits, which is at the expense of the artist who is trying to survive or earn his or 
her ‘dry crust of bread’.  
The growth of information technology and the use of the internet to distribute increasing 
volumes of information, has allowed the market to experience an increase in the supply of art. 
This benefits the market and frees the artist from the claws of the institution. This may mean 
lower returns for the few ‘privileged artists’. However, as a whole, it may mean greater future 
prosperity for the art world. 
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